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This article examines the latest developments in EU social policy, notably the target to 
reduce the number of individuals living in poverty and social exclusion by 20 million. Taking 
the target as a case study of contemporary EU social policy, we develop a framework to 
identify the key sets of conditions under which EU social policy could be said to be 
‘governable’. This leads us to select out: ideational coherence; degree of prioritisation 
within the policy hierarchy; and adequacy of governance mechanisms. The application of 
this conceptual matrix leads to the view that the EU target is both ungovernable and 
ungoverned. The target is ungovernable because it melds together different approaches to 
poverty and social exclusion and because some Member States in responding to it have 
added further to the diversity and incoherence by adopting definitions and approaches of 
their own. And the target is effectively ungoverned because of low political priority and 
uncertainty around its legal status, as well as ambiguity over how it fits into the Europe 2020 
process as a whole.  These are key contributing factors to the situation where, one year in, 
the numbers targeted by Member States fall short of the global EU target of 20 million by 




This article focuses on EU social policy as it is configured in relation to poverty and social 
exclusion by the successor to the EU’s Lisbon Strategy, Europe 2020. For at least a decade 
now social policy has been an innovative field of EU policy and governance. The Lisbon 
Strategy heralded new methods, procedures and resources for social policy and could be 
said to have provided a new impetus for social Europe. Europe 2020, the vehicle taking 
forward the EU’s policy commitments for the next decade, rests on three economic reform 
objectives that are designed (in theory) to be mutually reinforcing: ‘smart growth’ based on 
a knowledge economy; ‘sustainable growth’ promoting resource efficiency; and ‘inclusive 
growth’ focusing on high levels of employment and social cohesion. Europe 2020 makes 
poverty reduction one of the main social policy aims of the EU for the next decade with the 
objective of reducing the number of individuals living in poverty and social exclusion by 20 
million. In contrast to the qualitative approach taken during the Lisbon period from 2000 to 
2010, this first quantitative target for EU social policy appears to signify a significant 
ratcheting up of EU social policy, especially in relation to poverty and social exclusion. The 
aim of this article is to probe such an assumption. 
 
Theoretically, the analysis positions itself within the new modes of governance literature 
(e.g., de Búrca and Scott 2006; Héritier and Rhodes 2011; Zeitlin et al 2005). Not only is this 
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a most vibrant field of EU scholarship but also the approach is well-placed to analyse key 
developments in EU social policy, given that the EU has relied heavily on governance as a 
way of developing a social policy portfolio. Drawing in particular from Borrás and Radaelli’s 
(2011) concept of governance architectures, our analytical framework problematizes the 
development of EU social policy in terms of the interaction between ideas or policy 
concepts, place in the EU policy hierarchy, and governance mechanisms. The article makes 
the argument that, because of weaknesses in the way the poverty and social exclusion 
target in Europe 2020 is constructed and positioned, it is effectively ungovernable and, 
furthermore, the particularities of the political and governance architecture as a whole 
mean that the target is to all intents and purposes ungoverned. The claim, then, is of a 
double set of weaknesses. The explanation offered centres on ideational incoherence (at a 
number of different levels), insufficient political prioritization, and significant inadequacies 
in the governance procedures.  
 
The paper is organized into three main parts. The first part briefly considers the literature on 
EU governance using it as a base upon which to develop the analytic approach. In its second 
part, the paper examines the poverty and social exclusion target, considering in turn the 
coherence of the ideas and policy focus in light of Member State diversity, the place of 
poverty and social exclusion in the political and policy hierarchy of the EU, and the nature of 
the governance process in place. The third section brings the paper to a close by highlighting 
the current state of play and identifying the significant impediments to policy on poverty 
and social exclusion within the EU at present.  
 
1. A Conceptual Matrix:  Governance Architectures and Policy Domains 
 
The new governance literature is essentially concerned with the changing structure of 
political and administrative authority and, in an EU context, the move to more diverse and 
less law-bound methods of collective decision-making and policy implementation (as 
exemplified by the Open Method of Coordination - OMC) (e.g., de la Porte and Pochet 2004; 
Eberlain and Kerwer 2004; Héritier 2003; Héritier and Rhodes 2011; Radaelli 2003; Trubek 
and Mosher 2003; Zeitlin and Trubek 2003). This is a large and diversified set of literature, 
marked especially by discontinuities between work focused on the transnational and 
national levels. At the transnational level studies have predominantly focused on: the 
politics of and organizational particularities surrounding the formation and re-launch of the 
Lisbon Strategy; why Lisbon was formed and re-launched; and the political dynamics of 
Lisbon and the interests involved (Apeldoorn et al 2008; Archibugi and Coco 2005; Begg  
2007; Collignon 2009; Sapir, 2007). In national level scholarship compliance with EU policy 
and the ‘blocking’ impact of national politics have been the dominant points of interest. 
Within the latter strand, work by Büchs (2007), Graziano (2011) and Heidenreich and 
Bischoff (2008) among others has identified the importance of numerous intervening 
variables such as: the preferences of key institutional and social actors; ‘goodness-of-fit’ and 
‘mis-fit’ at the domestic level; government preferences; compliance with non-OMC EU 
policy; and the domestic economic situation. The different strands tend to result in an 
artificial binary in scholarship in that the national level literature on compliance evinces too 




In an attempt to overcome this and other weaknesses in the field, Borrás and Radaelli 
(2011) have proposed an overarching framework of ‘governance architectures’ to 
conceptualize the politics and institutional elements of strategies developed by 
international organizations. For these authors governance architectures, such as the Lisbon 
Strategy and Europe 2020, represent ‘strategic and long-term political initiatives of 
international organizations on cross cutting policy issues locked into commitments about 
targets and processes’. In the Borrás and Radaelli framing, governance architectures are 
situated at the meso level between the multi-level governance of an international 
institution and an individual policy programme. Such architectures are conceived as 
comprising ideational and organizational components. The ideational component is defined 
as: a set of fundamental ideational repertoires, expressed in notions such as ‘governance’, 
‘competitiveness’, ‘sustainability’, ‘knowledge based society’, the ‘market’ and a discourse 
that uses the ideational repertoires in order to discipline, organize and legitimize the 
hierarchical relationships between the goals and the policy instruments. Taken together, 
ideas and discourses give shape to the overall attempt to socialize actors into a specific 
frame of reference that is supposed to make sense of a complex world of cross-cutting 
policy problems. The organizational component comprises: formal and informal 
organizational arrangements (politico-organizational machinery) where the ideational 
repertoires and discourses are defined and patterned through complex political processes of 
a multi-level nature and the selection of policy instruments and their procedural 
requirements.  
In our view, this is a major contribution that takes the field forward in several ways. In the 
first instance, Borrás and Radaelli aim to go beyond the existing binaries to offer an 
integrated or encompassing framework that takes account of both the many fields in which 
the EU is now active and the EU’s attempt to integrate these through innovations in policy 
and governance. Furthermore, the arrangements for governance are to be simultaneously 
considered with and analysed in relation to the ideas and discourses involved in the policy 
portfolio, making for a more interactional and dynamic approach. In many ways its 
integrated framework – melding ideas, culture and norms with political and organizational 
factors – mirrors the breadth and integrational ambition of the Europe 2020 programme 
itself.  
While the governance architecture approach was primarily developed to conceptualize and 
explain ‘big initiatives’ relating to launch and re-launch of major strategies, we believe that 
it can also be applied to the analysis of particular policy areas. The poverty and social 
exclusion target provides a good case study in that the target is both novel and complex.  
We follow Borrás and Radaelli in emphasizing the role of politics and public policy at the 
transnational level and utilize their elaborations of the significance and meaning of 
ideational and organizational components. However, we suggest that the broader set of EU 
governance literature is also helpful in thinking through and developing a framework to 
analyse the conditions of governability for the poverty and social exclusion domain. 
The ideational component directs one to the discourse and semantic territory of leading 
concepts and ideas in the policy domain. While it is suggested that ambiguity in a 
governance architecture can be a positive feature (Borrás and Radaelli 2011: 474-5), one 
could also posit that at the policy specific level objectives need to provide coherence and be 
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meaningful, so that they are clearly communicable to actors and promote consensus and 
agentic engagement. Taken as a whole the new governance literature confirms the 
complexity of identifying concrete policy outcomes. This is not just because concrete 
outcomes of governance architectures that operate through review and learning can be 
difficult to identify. There is also the fact that when outcomes can be identified it is difficult 
to attribute them to particular governance architectures (Zeitlin 2007: 5). However, one 
level of impact reported by studies of recent EU social policy is the cognitive – because the 
methods were in the main oriented to negotiation, review and deliberation, they aimed for 
and it appears were successful in some cases in achieving learning and socialization 
(Armstrong 2011; Büchs 2007; Graziano 2011; Zeitlin 2009; Zeitlin et al 2005). To achieve 
cognitive and other shifts, policy objectives need to be coherent and meaningful. Objectives 
that are vague and incoherent are unlikely to generate even minimal cognitive shifts. This 
leads us to identify as a first level in our framework - the coherence of the ideas and policy 
objective - and to suggest that ideational incoherence is not just a risk of EU social policy, 
but a major barrier to the taking forward of objectives like the poverty and social exclusion 
target.   
The organizational component of a policy area is comprised of two aspects. The first relates 
to the overall priorities within the governance architecture and where a particular objective 
is situated among such priorities. This is to conceive of governance architectures as power 
hierarchies, wherein certain courses of action, interests and actors are privileged over 
others (Favell and Guiraudon 2011; Jenson and Mérand 2010; Kassim and Le Galès 2010). 
For example, Europe 2020 commits itself to ‘smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’ but 
behind such commitments may lie a hierarchy of priorities that privileges ‘smart growth’ 
over the other two. Furthermore, particular objectives may be ‘coupled’ within a 
governance architecture – that is, the achievement of particular objectives could be 
conditional upon progress on other policy objectives. This leads to the second substantive 
area of interest: where the policy objective is situated within the implicit or explicit priority 
hierarchy of the governance architecture.   
A further aspect of the organizational component concerns the governance instruments 
used to govern a policy objective. In the context of the EU, governance architectures include 
a panoply of possible policy instruments ranging from traditional hard law, new modes of 
governance such as the OMC (which is itself far from a homogenous governance 
arrangement), and soft law. Within this spectrum hard law is considered to be the most 
effective at creating compliance across the Member States; the OMC is seen to be more 
suited to cognitive shifts as opposed to concrete outputs; and traditional soft law is the 
weakest given the absence of regular reporting and peer review that features in the OMC  
(de Búrca and Scott 2006; Trubek and Mosher 2003; Trubek et al 2006; Zeitlin et al 2005). 
The governance instruments used for a particular policy objective therefore have a direct 
impact on what can be expected in terms of outcomes: on the basis of what is known to 
date policy objectives that utilize ‘harder’ governance instruments are likely to lead to more 
concrete outputs than policy objectives that utilize ‘softer instruments’. Governance 
arrangements that are unclear, uncertain and susceptible to continual shifts and change can 
be hypothesized to be weak and undermine the inherent incentive structure of the 
particular governance instrument(s). This leads to the third area of interest: the degree to 




The analysis that follows is centred therefore on three questions:  
 What is the ideational composition of the poverty and social exclusion target and 
how coherent is it? 
 Where does the target sit in relation to other policy objectives and the policy 
hierarchy and how much is it prioritized?  
 What governance instrument(s) are applied to the target and how consistent and 
stable are they?  
 
2. Poverty and Social Exclusion within Europe 2020 
 
2.1 The ideational composition of the poverty and social exclusion target  
 
Ceteris paribus, the agreement on the poverty target represents a step forward for the 
development of EU social policy. Targets are in many senses the epitome of rationality and 
betoken crystal clear agreement on policy goals. They imply a plan-led approach to a 
problem, calling upon a clear set of objectives and the achievement of well-specified goals 
that are realizable and meaningful politically. To what extent is this the case for the poverty 
and social exclusion target?  
 
The Europe 2020 poverty target is exemplary in several respects. For instance, it sets a clear 
time deadline and is ambitious (rather than being tokenistic). Its ambition may be gauged 
from the fact that it aims to achieve a reduction of some 17% in poverty prevalence across 
the EU by 2020. To give some idea of the scale of this ambition, over the course of the eight 
years of relative growth in Europe (2000-2008), the prevalence of relative income poverty in 
the EU as a whole remained more or less unchanged (Cantillon 2011). A further relevant 
aspect of the poverty target is that the EU is very specific about its constituents. In fact, the 
term ‘poverty target’ is something of a short-hand in that as defined it is based on three 
possible definitions or conceptualizations: income poverty, severe material deprivation, 
and/or jobless households. For the purposes of achieving the target, poverty in the Member 
States can relate to any one, two, or all three of these phenomena. The EU poverty target is, 
then, a construct in that: a) it does not refer to a single phenomenon; and b) Member States 
have a choice of which of the three approaches to adopt and may opt for an alternative 
approach provided they can justify its usage in terms of how it will contribute to the EU 
target overall. 
 
Our first reservation begins here and problematizes especially the fact that Member States 
have a choice of not just the level to set their target at but which indicator or ‘problem’ to 
use for the purpose of the target. To be sure, there are justifications for broadly defining the 
target – for example the nature and extent of the problems facing Member States (in 
general and on the three poverty indicators chosen) vary and so some leeway is advised. 
However, we suggest that the target risks being unworkable because of ideational and 
policy incoherence. This directs attention to the underlying philosophy and policy approach 
and the empirical manifestations of the phenomena invoked by each of the three 




First, in terms of policy approach what seems like a coherent set of indicators actually draws 
from diverse philosophies of welfare and views about the best approach to combat poverty 
and social exclusion. The first element – being below a 60% cut-off of median income – is 
the classic relative poverty measure based on how one’s income compares to the societal 
average. As an approach to social policy it calls for either income redistribution (if poverty is 
seen in terms of falling below a relative income threshold) or the guaranteeing of a basic or 
minimum income threshold below which no one should fall (if an absolute approach is 
taken). The EU has never settled on relative income poverty as a definition of poverty – 
even though it is the most widely-used definition of poverty in Member States - and the 
redistributionist social policy model implied by a relative poverty approach has had limited 
appeal or support at EU level. The second component of the target – being without at least 
four items out of a nine-item list of ‘deprivations’i – picks up on lifestyle deprivation and 
access to customary standards of living. It addresses one of the weaknesses of the relative 
income poverty threshold which is that it does not give sufficient weight to living standards 
and the lack of correlation between income and standard of living, especially in countries 
where living and income standards are low (De Graaf-Zijl and Nolan 2011: 425). As a policy 
response, adequate income is important here, too, but so also are social services and 
measures to combat social exclusion (such as for example better educational and labour 
market opportunities for people). The third dimension of the target links into household 
joblessness – as defined the number of people in a household where the adults worked less 
than 20% of their total work-time potential during the reference period. Two ‘problems’ 
underlie this: work intensity on the part of individuals in the same household or family; the 
perceived morally corrosive effects of joblessness on people who share a home or 
residence. This does not problematize unemployment per se, then, but rather its 
distribution or concentration among people living in the same household or family. The 
perceived solution is to intervene in what is viewed especially as a family or 
intergenerational cycle whereby people become demotivated, and disadvantage and poor 
access to the labour market get more entrenched as time passes and generations succeed 
each other. There are three required policy actions: to make more jobs available; to target 
these jobs towards people in households where there is too little engagement with 
employment; and to make people in such households available for employment and 
wanting to be employed.  
 
The risk of incoherence in definition and approach is strengthened by weaknesses or lack of 
strong linkages between the different dimensions of the poverty target within and across 
countries. Research suggests that, while there is a strong relationship between income 
poverty and material deprivation, joblessness as a characteristic of households is a very 
different kind of phenomenon and one that is but poorly correlated with either poverty or 
material deprivation (de Graaf-Zijl and Nolan 2011). People living in jobless households are 
not necessarily poor. Nolan and Whelan (2011: 16) demonstrate that over a quarter of 
people classified as being in jobless households in the EU as a whole are from professional 
and managerial backgrounds and only 43% are drawn from working class backgrounds, 
suggesting at a minimum that this population is highly differentiated and that people live in 
jobless households for a host of reasons among which may not be a shortage of money. 
Their findings lead the authors to suggest that joblessness might be better thought of as a 
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factor leading to income poverty or material deprivation than as an indicator of poverty per 
se (ibid: 18). Hence, measures to address household joblessness will not contribute hugely 
to reducing poverty and material deprivation and vice versa.  
 
The underlying point, then, is that the poverty and social exclusion target rests on 
components that are so diverse that they risk incoherence and this threatens even the most 
basic of cognitive shifts.     
 
2.2 The location of the poverty and social exclusion target in relation to other policy 
objectives and the policy hierarchy  
 
Governance architectures are not value-free arenas in which agreed objectives and policy 
instruments are given an equal weight. Rather, they are embedded in political strategies 
that privilege certain interests and actors over others, create hierarchies of priority, and 
reflect a broader set of socio-political inequalities among actors and interests. Given this, to 
fully understand the significance of the poverty and social exclusion target, it is necessary to 
locate it as a policy objective in the hierarchy constituted by Europe 2020 as a whole. 
 
A leitmotif of Europe 2020 is integration across the constituent policy areas. Five such areas 
are selected for policy integration and reform through quantified targets: employment; 
spending on research and innovation; climate change and energy use; early school leaving 
and participation in tertiary education; and poverty and social inclusion. In a second tier, the 
programme consists of 10 integrated guidelines containing both the Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines (BEPG) and those relating to Europe 2020. One of the latter guidelines, located 
under the heading of employment, relates to the poverty and social exclusion domain and 
commits the EU to “promoting social inclusion and combating poverty, clearly supporting 
income security for vulnerable groups, social economy, social innovation, gender equality, 
and the poverty headline target”.ii  At a third level, there are Flagship Initiatives which, 
jointly undertaken by EU and national actors and steered by the European Commission, 
centre on thematic priorities intended to support the achievement of the five EU-level 
targets. One of the seven Flagship Initiatives is devoted to poverty and social exclusion.iii 
This is the European Platform against Poverty and Social Exclusion. The term ‘platform’ is 
meant to refer to a hub or host of initiatives oriented to bringing about social and territorial 
cohesion. Five areas of action have been identified for the Platform (European Commission, 
2010b, 2010c). These include making EU funds deliver on the social inclusion and social 
cohesion objectives, promoting evidence-based social innovation, promoting a partnership 
approach and the social economy and stepping up policy coordination between the 
Member States. 
 
What should we make of this?  
  
The background to the strong integration theme is that the re-launched Lisbon Strategy in 
2005 (Lisbon II) institutionalized a historical and structural separation between social policy 
on the one hand and economic, monetary and employment policy on the other (Tholoniat 
2010). This has always been a source of criticism on the part of social actors, and has left a 
lingering suspicion in these quarters that poverty and social exclusion are afterthoughts or 
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‘add-ons’ to the process of European integration. The more integrated nature of Europe 
2020 was trumpeted as one of its strengths, especially in relation to establishing more 
formal linkages between the different policy pillars (economic, monetary and employment) 
and the inclusion of poverty and social exclusion into the mainstream governance process 
(via its incorporation into the employment pillar). The launching of the European Semester 
is also intended to further the integrative character of EU governance by synchronizing 
processes and procedures with the creation of an EU business cycle for EU matters (by 
linking the reporting of Europe 2020 with the annual reports of the Stability and Growth 
Pact).  
 
We suggest that, with respect to poverty and social exclusion, the ‘integrated’ nature of 
Europe 2020 does little to improve the status of the policy area relative to Lisbon II and in 
particular that the poverty and social exclusion target remains a third order priority within 
the new governance architecture   
 
Documents produced by the European Commission associated with the launch of Europe 
2020 and activities since reveal the hierarchy of priorities. The formation of the European 
Semester is intended to ensure that governments adhere to fiscal discipline and 
developments within Europe 2020 are to demonstrate an appreciation of this principle. 
Progress in the strategy’s microeconomic and employment pillars are to be much more 
tightly linked to macroeconomic developments. In other words, developments in the 
thematic components of Europe 2020 are rendered a function of progress in the macro 
economy. This principle was further emphasized by the Commission which proposed that 
selected thematic issues “could also be addressed to the extent that they have 
macroeconomic implications through the recommendations under the BEPGs” (European 
Commission 2010c: 28). In other words, despite the Commission arguing that Member 
States “must find room in their budgets” for thematic issues (European Commission 2010a: 
3), if macroeconomic conditions become unfavourable (through excessive government 
deficit or debt levels), then spending on the thematic components of Europe 2020 should be 
restricted until ‘sound’ public finances are re-established. This represents a clear privileging 
of activity and progress in the macroeconomic pillar over other pillars and thereby 
empowers actors within DG Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), as well as those 
operating in Finance Ministries at the national level, over any other grouping of decision-
makers.  
 
A second hierarchy prevails as well. In Europe 2020 there is a hierarchy of priorities in which 
some objectives are deemed more important than others. Both the 2011 and 2012 Annual 
Growth Surveys produced by the Commission provide an insight into the EU’s current 
priorities. Both Surveys make fiscal consolidation the number one priority (in line with the 
above), to be followed by the second order priorities of ‘promoting growth and 
competiveness’ (i.e., microeconomic reforms) and promoting employment (European 
Commission 2010a). No mention is made of the aim to reduce poverty and social exclusion 
other than in the annex of the Surveys. This suggests that the aim to reduce Europe’s poor 




More broadly, the EU’s response to the Euro-zone crisis exacerbates these hierarchical 
tendencies and reinforces the order of priorities within Europe 2020. Of the so-called ‘six-
pack’ of measures,iv the two most important reforms have been the strengthening of the 
fiscal rules under the Stability and Growth Pact, known as the Euro Plus Pact, and the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure to address the issue of current account deficits. The Euro Plus 
Pact is designed to be a more stringent successor to the Stability and Growth Pact which had 
not been consistently adhered to across the Member States.v Indirectly, these 
developments reinforce the hierarchical relationships among priorities of Europe 2020.   
 
Therefore, as the Euro-zone crisis has continued to gather momentum, the broader set of 
reforms to the EU’s economic governance has reinforced the low priority of the poverty and 
social exclusion target. It has also tended to alter the EU representation of poverty and 
social exclusion – in EU discourse these are now increasingly represented as among the 
‘social consequences of the crisis’ (European Council 2012) whereas at the time when the 
target was being negotiated there was a sense of poverty and social exclusion as 
representing inherent failures in the social system. Moreover, since 14 of the EU’s 27 
Member States have government debt levels above the 60% of total GDP threshold 
(Eurostat 2011: 1) raising the possibility of a ‘fine’, there are strong incentives for such 
Member States to reduce their government debt via spending reductions, leaving few 
resources to address the thematic issues and perhaps even worsening poverty and social 
exclusion.  
 
2.3 The governance instrument(s)   
 
During the Lisbon decade, the OMC in poverty and social exclusion operated outside of the 
mainstream governance cycle. One could say that it established its own logic centring on 
policy review and learning. It was set apart also by not featuring the issuing of Country 
Specific Recommendations by the Council/Commission. The OMC social inclusion was seen 
as one of the weaker OMC governance processes, with cognitive shifts as its main claim to 
impact. Europe 2020’s incorporation of poverty and social exclusion into the employment 
pillar suggests prima facie a strengthening in its governance within the EU fold, since 
employment is generally considered to be an advanced sphere of the OMC (Tholoniat 2010), 
featuring an annual governance cycle of commonly agreed guidelines, the reporting of 
progress in the form of National Reform Programmes, and peer review and some external 
pressure through the issuing of Country Specific Recommendations. To what extent has 
poverty and social exclusion been integrated?    
 
A crucial first point is that the full incorporation of poverty and social exclusion into the 
employment pillar has been stymied by disputes over the legal mandate. Whereas 
employment policy has an explicit place in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union under Article 148, the Treaty grants the EU but loose and inchoate powers in relation 
to poverty and social exclusion. The issuing of Country Specific Recommendations in this 
domain is therefore contentious and a source of dispute between the Commission and some 
Member States. Countries that have expressed stiff opposition include Denmark, Poland and 
the UK. This means that although social exclusion and poverty are now subject to an annual 
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review and policy cycle under Europe 2020, Member State engagement remains voluntary 
and the issuing of Country Specific Recommendations contentious and to date little utilized.   
 
A second critical point concerns the uncertainty and instability surrounding the governance 
of the poverty and social exclusion target. Under the auspices of the Council, both 
employment and poverty and social exclusion are the responsibility of the Employment and 
Social Policy Council (EPSCO), but within EPSCO they are governed separately by the 
Employment Committee and the Social Protection Committee. Moreover, following the 
launch of Europe 2020, the OMC social inclusion, which had been a focal point of 
governance activity for the Social Protection Committee, was suspended. This has left 
uncertainty as to both the process and the agents responsible for monitoring and 
encouraging progress towards the poverty target at EU level and also among and within 
Member States.  
 
A third point is about instability. Half way into the first year of its operation in June 2011 the 
EPSCO Council decided to reintroduce some elements of the OMC into the Europe 2020 
process. Endorsing the Social Protection Committee “Opinion on Reinvigorating the Social 
OMC in the Context of Europe 2020" (European Council 2011b), it was decided that Member 
States must now produce National Social Reports in addition to National Reform 
Programmes. The plan is for short strategic reports on each of the three strands of the social 
OMC established under Lisbon – social inclusion, pensions and health/social care – wherein 
Member States present their strategies and progress achieved towards the Common 
Objectives for Social Protection and Social Inclusion.vi These are to be used as an input into 
the Social Protection Committee annual report on the social situation and the development 
of social protection and to have an input also into the assessment of progress achieved by 
Member States in the context of the 2012 European Semester, including as part of the 
multilateral surveillance, organized by the SPC. 
 
Not only might this change contribute to a destabilizing of the process, but it could be 
argued to reinforce the lower status of the poverty and social exclusion target rather than to 
upgrade it. This is because a new process had again to be introduced to try and raise the 
profile of social policy and this runs the risk of institutionalizing old separations. Without 
first-hand evidence it is impossible to know how Member States view the reintroduction of 
social reporting. However, they may be said to be marching with their feet in that three 
months after the deadline of mid-April 2012, only 14 of the 27 Member States have 
submitted their National Social Reports.vii  This is in comparison to 100% submission of 
National Reform Programmes.  By November 2012 the submission rate of the National 
Social  Reports had increased to 21 . All this is indicative of a considerable amount of foot-
dragging within the Member States.   
 
A further point is that the ambiguities surrounding the governance of poverty and social 
exclusion within Europe 2020 have been further heightened by the uncertainties of the 
purpose and function of the European Platform against Poverty and Social Exclusion. The 
stated aim of the Platform is to create a commitment among the Member States, EU 
institutions and key stakeholders to fight poverty and social exclusion. In doing so, it intends 
to identify best practice and promote mutual learning, establish EU-wide rules, and make 
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necessary EU funds available.viii However, the Platform is rather vague as a form of 
governance.  In particular, the linkages between it and the social OMC have not been made 
clear, almost two years into the Europe 2020 process. Hence, the governance of poverty and 
social exclusion is based on a voluntary agreement between the Member States in which 
there is dispute over the legal mandate, and considerable uncertainty, instability and 
ambiguity about the target and how it is to be governed.   
 
3. Conclusion: Consequences and State of Play 
 
Essentially, any EU global target is only as good as the targets that are uploaded to the EU 
level. In this regard, the poverty and social exclusion target is subject to two main risks:  that 
Member States will choose a focus that is not consonant with the EU’s way of conceiving 
poverty; or they will choose a target that is too low to make a sufficient contribution to the 
EU-level target.   
 
Regarding the actual definitions chosen by the Member States, the latest information 
available at the time of writing (November 2012) suggests that the first jeopardy has come 
to pass. Three Member States (Germany, Sweden and the UK) have exercised the choice 
implicit in the framing of the target and opted for a different set of indicators to that of the 
EU. This makes for some seven different kinds of target in all (three from the 
aforementioned Member States, plus four from the possible six implicit in the EU target – 
see Table I). This underlines our fear of imperilled governability because of incoherence. In 
terms of the actual targets set, the second jeopardy has also occurred in that the estimates 
available to date point to a great shortfall in the EU target. In fact, the EU target is short by 
between 5 and 8 million people.ix Even if we take a loose view of the targeted numbers, this 
level of shortfall is quite extraordinary. Furthermore as Table I illustrates, four Member 
States (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Sweden and the UK) have not committed to a specific 
quantitative target.  
 
Table I: Member State Responses to Poverty Target   
  
Member State  Indicator(s) of Poverty National targeted reduction 
Austria  Combination of at-risk-of-poverty, material 
deprivation and jobless-households 
235,000 
Belgium Combination of at risk-of-poverty, material 
deprivation and jobless-households 
380,000 
Bulgaria  Jobless-households 260,000 
Cyprus Combination of at risk-of-poverty, material 
deprivation and jobless-households 
27,000 
Czech Republic Combination of at risk-of-poverty, material 
deprivation and jobless-households 
Maintaining persons at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion at 2008 level (15.3 %) 
with efforts to reduce by 30,000  
Germany Long-term unemployed 330,000 
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Denmark  Jobless-households  22,000 
Estonia  Combination of material deprivation and 
jobless-household 
Reduce poverty rate from 17.5% in 2010 
to 15% by 2020.  
Greece Combination of at risk-of-poverty, material 
deprivation and jobless-households 
450,000 
Spain Combination of at risk-of-poverty, material 
deprivation and jobless-households 
1,400,000 –  
1,500,000 
Finland Combination of at risk-of-poverty, material 
deprivation and jobless-households 
150,000 
France At risk-of-poverty (anchored in time) 1,600,000 
Hungary Combination of at risk-of-poverty, material 
deprivation and jobless-households 
450,000 
Ireland  Combination of at risk-of-poverty and 
material deprivation 
186,000 
Italy Combination of material deprivation and 
jobless-households 
2,200,000 
Lithuania  Combination of at risk-of-poverty, material 
deprivation and jobless-households 
170,000 
Luxembourg Jobless-households 6,000 
Latvia Combination of material deprivation and 
jobless-household 
121,000 
Malta Combination of at risk-of-poverty, material 
deprivation and jobless-households 
100,000 
Netherlands  Jobless-households 100,000 
Poland Combination of at risk-of-poverty, material 
deprivation and jobless-households 
1,500,000 
Portugal Combination of at risk-of-poverty, material 
deprivation and jobless-households 
200,000 
Romania  Material deprivation 580,000 
Sweden  Reduce number not in labour force, long-
term unemployed and long-term sick 
To keep poverty below current level of 
14 % 
Slovenia  Combination of at risk-of-poverty, material 
deprivation and jobless-households 
40,000 
Slovakia  Combination of at risk-of-poverty, material 
deprivation and jobless-households 
170,000 
UK  Existing numerical targets of the 2010 No quantitative target given in NRP 
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Source: Compiled from 2011 and 2012 National Reform Programmes available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm  and 2012 National Social Reports available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/keyDocuments.jsp?pager.offset=0&langId=en&mode=advancedSubmit&policyArea
=750&subCategory=758&year=0&country=0&type=0&advSearchKey=SPCNationalSocialReport – accessed 
29/10/2012.  
All of this raises huge questions about why the target was agreed. While we cannot pursue 
this in any depth we know that the President of the Commission voiced strong commitment 
to some set of EU actions on poverty as part of Europe 2020 and that in his engagement 
with the European Parliament around the ratification of his second term he strongly 
promoted an anti-poverty role for the EU. There were other strong promoters of the 
poverty and social exclusion target also: the social NGOs in Brussels lobbied the Commission 
for an EU reform strategy with a stronger focus on social Europe; Member States including 
Belgium, Cyprus, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain argued strongly for a poverty target when 
it was being debated in 2010; and so too did the President of the European Council, Herman 
Van Rompuy (Copeland and Daly 2012: 276-279). From the point of these actors, the target 
represents a genuine attempt to expand the role of the EU in social policy. A problem for 
the target, and one that has undermined it considerably, is that some Member States were 
opposed to it and would only agree to a target that maximised flexibility and minimised 
commitment. Furthermore, there have been government changes within a number of 
Member States that initially supported the target which among other things has led to a 
deepening of austerity across the European continent.  
 
The underlying point to be emphasized, then, is that what seemed like a sound idea at the 
time of agreeing the target – to have it diversely constituted - has profound implications. 
Such implications have two expressions at national level. The first relates to how the 
poverty target fits with the national social policy model and the second to the volume of 
resources required to address the target. In the current economic and political scenario in 
the EU, it is difficult if not impossible for some countries, especially the poorer ones, to 
make a significant dent in their poverty numbers. All of this underlines the risks in taking a 
global target for a Union that is so diverse in terms of economic development and social 
problems. Indeed, some commentators have suggested that one way out of this conundrum 
is for a cross-border budgetary transfer mechanism to compensate all Member States for 
the redistributive effort they would have to make in order to reach the target of eliminating 
poverty risks (Vandenbroucke et al 2012). However, the same authors are quick to point out 
that, given the bitter resistance to any suggestion of a ‘transfer union’, such a proposal 
belongs to the realm of political fiction.  
 
The analysis undertaken here has suggested that the poverty target is both ungovernable 
and ungoverned, and is incapable, because of ideational, political and governance-related 
weaknesses, of bringing social policy in from the margins of the European integration 
process. While it is novel in an EU context to have a target for poverty and social exclusion, 
and the target itself has some innovative and ambitious elements, the EU’s great 
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i These items are: i) to pay rent or utility bills, ii) keep one’s home adequately warm, iii) face unexpected 
expenses, iv) eat meat, fish, or a protein equivalent every second day, v) a week of holiday away from home 
once a year, vi) a car, vii) a washing machine, viii) a colour television, ix) a telephone. 
ii The other three employment guidelines relate to increasing labour market participation and reducing 
structural unemployment, developing a skilled workforce, and improving the performance of education and 
training systems and increasing tertiary education participation (European Commission 2010a).  
iii Along with poverty and social exclusion, the other Flagship Initiatives relate to:  a digital agenda, innovation, 
youth employment and mobility, sustainable development, industrial policy, employment 
iv A Directive and three Regulations on Common Budgetary Frameworks and two Regulations on macro-
economic imbalances.  
v The Euro Plus Pact calls for: the abolition of wage indexation and deregulating industries to improve 
productivity; lowering taxes on labour and ensuring fiscally sustainable pension, healthcare and social benefit 
systems to restore public finances; and the development of a corporate tax base (European Council 2011a: 14-
15).  
vi These pre-date Europe 2020, having been agreed under the Lisbon Strategy’s second phase in 2006. They 
relate to social cohesion, equality between men and women and equal opportunities for all through adequate, 
accessible, financially sustainable, adaptable and efficient social protection systems and social inclusion 
policies; effective and mutual interaction between the Lisbon objectives of greater economic growth, more 
and better jobs and greater social cohesion, and with the EU's Sustainable Development Strategy; good 
governance, transparency and the involvement of stakeholders in the design, implementation and monitoring 
of policy (European Commission 2005).  
vii Those outstanding (as of mid-July 2012) include Austria, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden.    
18 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
viii See: http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=961&langId=en – accessed 15/07/2012.    
ix See: http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/reaching-the-goals/monitoring-progress/recommendations-
2011/index_en.htm  - accessed 13/07/2012.   
